Recent evidence from cognitive science and neuroscience indicates that brain-damaged patients and normal subjects can exhibit nonconscious or implicit knowledge of stimuli that they fail to recollect consciously or perceive explicitly. Dissociations between implicit and explicit knowledge, which have been observed across a variety of domains, tasks, and materials, raise fundamental questions about the nature of perception, memory, and consciousness. This article provides a selective review of relevant evidence and considers such phenomena as priming and implicit memory in amnesic patients and normal subjects, perception without awareness and "blindsight" in patients with damage to visual cortex, and nonconscious recognition of familiar faces in patients with facial-recognition deficits (prosopagnosia). A variety of theoretical approaches to implicit/explicit dissociations are considered. One view is that all of the various dissociations can be attributed to disruption or disconnection of a common mechanism underlying conscious experience; an alternative possibility is that each dissociation requires a separate explanation in terms of domain-specific processes and systems. More generally, it is concluded that rather than reflecting the operation of affectively charged unconscious processes of the kind invoked by psychodynamic or Freudian theorists, dissociations between implicit and explicit knowledge are a natural consequence of the ordinary computations of the brain.
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Consider the following two clinical scenarios. In the first, a patient with memory problems is shown a list of familiar words and several minutes later is unable to remember any of the list items when asked to recollect them; indeed, he denies that a list of words had been presented. But when he is required to perform an incidental test that does not require conscious recollection of the list, the patient's performance indicates perfectly normal retention of the previously studied words. In the second scenario, a patient with perceptual problems is exposed to a bright visual stimulus and claims to see nothing. Yet when asked to "guess" in which of two locations the stimulus appeared, the patient performs well above the chance level, indicating that she has in some sense "seen"-despite the absence of conscious experience-the target stimulus.
The foregoing scenarios may seem surprising and even bizarre: How can a patient exhibit memory without remembering or perception without perceiving? It is tempting to suggest that the patients suffer from psychiatric problems or, perhaps, are engaging in outright deception of the examiner. On the contrary, however, these two scenarios represent examples ofwhat have become almost commonplace observations in the neuropsychological laboratory and are often referred to as dissociations between explicit and implicit knowledge (1) . Explicit knowledge refers to knowledge that is expressed as conscious experience and that people are aware that they possess; the everyday uses of such terms as "seeing" and "remembering" refer to explicit knowledge. Implicit knowledge, by contrast, refers to knowledge that is revealed in task performance without any corresponding phenomenal awareness; implicit knowledge is often expressed unintentionally and tapped indirectly. Far from reflecting psychiatric symptoms or dissimulation, dissociations between explicit and implicit knowledge are providing important new insights into the fundamental nature of perception, memory, and conscious experience.
The terms explicit and implicit knowledge are quite similar in meaning to conscious and unconscious knowledge, and the two sets of terms can be used interchangeably. However, traditional conceptions of unconscious knowledge have been tied closely to Freudian and other psychodynamic constructs such as repression, drive, conflict, and the like. As this article should make evident, these concepts have little relevance to the kinds of phenomena that have been the subject of recent neuropsychological and cognitive studies. Because the classical i notion of the "unconscious" is so closely linked to psychodynamic ideas, it seems I prudent to use terminology that is not 1 similarly burdened (for more extended I discussion, see ref. 2) .
The article provides a selective over-X view of research that has documented E nd explored dissociations between ex-i licit and implicit knowledge. It will fo-r -us primarily on explicit/implicit disso-c ,iations in patients with memory disor-I ders and perceptual disorders, although similar phenomena that have been documented in other patient populations will also be noted. In addition, some attention will be paid to analogous dissociations that have been produced in cognitive studies of normal, non-brain-damaged subjects. The article will conclude by surveying theoretical accounts ofthe various dissociations and by considering whether these diverse phenomena depend on similar underlying mechanisms. Taken together, the neuropsychological and cognitive evidence suggests that, rather than reflecting the operation of affectively charged psychodynamic processes, many implicit or unconscious expressions of knowledge occur as a relatively routine consequence of the ordinary computations of the brain.
Memory Disorders
The most extensively studied neurological disorder of memory is known as the amnesic syndrome, which occurs as a consequence of various kinds of pathological conditions (e.g., stroke, encephalitis, anoxia) that produce damage to medial temporal and diencephalic brain regions (3, 4) . Amnesic patients are characterized by a marked inability to remember recent experiences together with normal perception and intelligence. Their memory disorders are evident on a variety of explicit memory tests, including free recall, where patients attempt to retrieve recently presented items without the aid of experimenter-provided cues; cued recall, where various cues or hints are provided to assist recollection; and recognition, where previously studied items are presented together with new items, and subjects indicate which item they recollect from the study list.
Despite their severe impairments in explicitly remembering recently presented information, it has been established beyond dispute that amnesic patients can show intact implicit memory for aspects of the same information. One of the most intensively studied implicit memory phenomena in amnesia is known as repetition or direct priming: the facilitated ability to identify, or make judgments about, target stimuli as a consequence of a recent exposure to them (5 (17) (18) (19) (20) . It has also been shown that priming effects in amnesia can be quite long-lived, lasting across retention intervals ofdays, weeks, or months (21) (22) (23) .
Research on priming effects in amnesic patients has been complemented by a large and ever-increasing literature on normal subjects, indicating that priming can be dissociated sharply from explicit memory (for reviews, see refs. [24] [25] [26] . One particularly important finding is that priming effects on various implicit memory tests are relatively unaffected by manipulations of how subjects encode target materials during study-list presentation. For example, when subjects are induced to process the semantic attributes of words at the time of study (e.g., make judgments about a word's meaning), their recollection of the word on subsequent explicit memory tests is generally much higher than when they are induced to process nonsemantic physical features of the target words (e.g., count the number of vowels in a word). But the magnitude of priming effects is similar following the two kinds of study tasks (20, 27, 28) . Moreover, the priming effect appears to be modality-specific: It is reduced by study-to-test changes in visual or auditory modality of presentation (28, 29) . Under certain circumstances, priming is even reduced by study-to-test changes in the particular type font or case in which a word appears (30, 31) or the voice in which a word is spoken (32) . These Taken together, the data from amnesic patients and normal subjects indicate clearly that memory for various kinds of experiences can be expressed independently from, and in the absence of, conscious recollection of those experiences.
Perceptual Disorders
At about the same time that early evidence was accumulating on implicit memory in amnesic patients, there were reports of a puzzling and, in some respects, analogous phenomenon in patients with disturbances of visual perception. Initially documented by Poppel, Held, and Frost (48), the phenomenon was referred to as "blindsight" by Weiskrantz and colleagues (49) There has also been a good deal a recent research on implicit knowledge i] patients with prosopagnosia-the im paired ability to recognize familiar faces usually because of bilateral lesions ti occipito-temporal cortex. Although suci patients typically deny any familiarity with faces that ordinarily would be wet known to them (e.g., a spouse or rela tive), there is now considerable evidence that they possess implicit knowledge o: those faces. Early evidence was provided in a psychophysiological study by Bauer (57) , in which a prosopagnosic patient viewed a familiar face and at the same time listened to the experimenter read a series of names; one belonged to the face and the others did not. Despite failing to recognize the face explicitly, the patient showed a maximal skin conductance response to the correct name. Tranel and Damasio (58) replicated and extended this phenomenon using a different paradigm for eliciting skin-conductance responses to familiar faces that their patient failed to recognize explicitly.
Young and De Haan and their colleagues have provided a systematic series of studies using behavioral measures to demonstrate and explore implicit facial familiarity in prosopagnosic patients (for review, see ref. 59 ). For example, they reported the case of a patient who performed at chance levels when required to choose which of two faces (one famous, one unknown) was familiar. However, when given a matching task in which subjects judged whether two simultanein-ously exposed faces were the same iof different, the patient-just like norm ug-control subjects-responded moi im-quickly when the two faces were famot ar-than when they were unknown. Sim to larly, they also found that the patient wc le-slower to learn a name-face pairing whe ro-a familiar face was paired with an inco er, rect name than when it was paired with m-correct name, even though he claime for that none (59) . Merikle (63) has delineated several reasons why it probably makes sense to accept data from subjective measures as evidence for failure of conscious perception. Nevertheless, it seems clear that careful attention must be paid to possible differences in underlying mechanisms when implicit knowledge is inferred from failures on subjective or objective measure of conscious perception, respectively.
Additional Neuropsychological Evidence for Implicit Knowledge
Although most of the work on implicit knowledge in neuropsychological syndromes has involved disorders of memory and perception, similar kinds of evidence have been gleaned from patients with a variety of neuropsychological deficits. Milberg and Blumstein and their colleagues (65) , for example, have studied aphasic patients who exhibit severe deficits on explicit tests of language comprehension and yet show robust semantic priming effects for words that they fail to understand explicitly. Tyler (66) has described other kinds of aphasic patients who are unable to make explicit judgments about the meaning and grammaticality of sentences. But the performance of these patients on a target-monitoring task was disrupted by semantic and grammatical violations, and the pattern ofdisruption was similar to that observed in normal control subjects. Evidence for implicit knowledge has also been seen in studies of patients with reading disorders, who appear able to makejudgments about properties of words that they cannot identify consciously (e.g., ref. 67 ). And observations suggestive of implicit knowledge have been reported in patients who exhibit spatial neglect, associative agnosia, and unawareness of deficit (for review, see ref. 1).
Theories and Mechanisms
The seemingly ubiquitous evidence for preserved implicit knowledge despite impaired explicit knowledge across a variety ofpatient groups, experimental tasks, and knowledge domains is compelling. Moreover, the converging evidence in several instances from studies of nonbrain-damaged subjects indicates that the basic phenomenon is characteristic of normal cognitive function and is not some sort of exotic curiosity that occurs only in pathological conditions. What are we to make of these striking and counterintuitive phenomena? Although current theoretical understanding of them is rather modest, several different approaches can be distinguished.
The "family resemblance" among the various implicit/explicit dissociations across a variety of conditions has suggested to some that it is appropriate to seek a common explanation for them. For instance, Schacter et An important observation supporting this kind of multiple memory systems account is that amnesic patients typically exhibit normal levels of implicit memory despite severely impaired explicit memory; accordingly, it makes sense to postulate that independent brain systems support the two forms of memory. By contrast, in the other neuropsychological syndromes discussed in this article, patients typically do not exhibit entirely normal performance on tasks that tap implicit knowledge, so it is more difficult to argue that independent brain systems underlie explicit and implicit knowledge (for discussion of the "multiple visual systems" approach to blindsight, see refs. 55, 56, and 73) . For example, Wallace and Farah (74) have suggested that in some cases of prosopagnosia, residual implicit knowledge may be a natural consequence of impairment to the facial processing system that normally supports explicit knowledge. They noted that in simulations of prosopagnosia with a neural network, when "lesions" are made to a part of the network that supports facial recognition, the network still shows some residual ability to "perform" tasks analogous to those used to demonstrate implicit facial knowledge in prosopagnosic patients. This kind ofobservation is consistent with the idea that when patients exhibit some, but not normal, levels of implicit knowledge, the effect may be attributable to the impaired functioning of a damaged system that normally supports explicit knowledge.
Because research in this area is still in its infancy, it is too early to state confidently whether a unified theoretical account of different implicit/explicit dissociations will be possible or whether it will be necessary to construct separate do- 
